PpT HE major purpose of this work is to improve our understanding of investment behavior in one important industry, the railroad industry, over some seven decades of American history. This investigation makes one important departure from most investment studies. The primary emphasis is to isolate the likely changes in investment behavior which occur as the industry passes through a fairly predictable set of institutional and growth phases. The basic thesis, explicitly tested in the material that follows, is that the determinants of investment depend critically upon the phase of the industry's life-cycle. For example, the relative importance of capital costs for firm expansion may assume quite different proportions for a mature industry than for one beginning adolescent growth. In the same fashion, the relative importance of internal profits as a source of funds is likely to vary with the position of the industry in its life-cycle. In addition, the speed of response to evidence of profitability may change with the age of the industry, its growth, and its ability to absorb risk. We present below an extensive description of expected shifts in the railroad industry's investment behavior over time.
I Introduction
PpT HE major purpose of this work is to improve our understanding of investment behavior in one important industry, the railroad industry, over some seven decades of American history. This investigation makes one important departure from most investment studies. The primary emphasis is to isolate the likely changes in investment behavior which occur as the industry passes through a fairly predictable set of institutional and growth phases. The basic thesis, explicitly tested in the material that follows, is that the determinants of investment depend critically upon the phase of the industry's life-cycle. For example, the relative importance of capital costs for firm expansion may assume quite different proportions for a mature industry than for one beginning adolescent growth. In the same fashion, the relative importance of internal profits as a source of funds is likely to vary with the position of the industry in its life-cycle. In addition, the speed of response to evidence of profitability may change with the age of the industry, its growth, and its ability to absorb risk. We present below an extensive description of expected shifts in the railroad industry's investment behavior over time.
The reasons for selecting the railroads should be evident. This is one of the few American industries for which we have considerable investment data relating to the major portion of its complete life-cycle. Recently, information covering the period since 1870 became available with the appearance of Ulmer's impressive volume [21] . Ulmer has assembled annual estimates of gross and net investment, output, and capital stock, all in constant and current prices. Although Fishlow has recently pointed out some weaknesses in Ulmer's data,' it appears to us unduly cautious to abstain from using this wealth of historical information while awaiting future revisions.
This introductory background gives rise to the following plan for this paper. Section II reviews and classifies the historical background of railroad development over our period of interest. In that section we develop and define the life-cycle stages which we use in the tests themselves. Section III presents the models of investment behavior which we attempt to test in section IV. Section V follows with a summary of the study's results.
II Stages of Growth
Ulmer's estimates of railroad investment and output are an obvious aid in defining the industry's growth stages over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Concentrating our attention on periods of peak investment rates, it would appear that net railroad investment increased by increasing amounts between 1840 and 1857. Between the approximate dates 1857 and 1881, net capital formation increased by decreasing amounts while the subsequent period 1881-1931, was one of declining net capital formation but at levels which were still typically positive. After 1931, the level of net railroad investment was generally negative. Furthermore, gross capital formation most certainly reached an all-time high in the preWorld War I decade.
We are also able to quantify our impressionistic notions concerning the relative importance of the railroads in total aggregate demand. The output of the railroads as a share of gross national product reached its maximum during the period of intensive World War I use (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) (1915) (1916) (1917) (1918) (1919) (1920) A further test of Klein's models arises from our emphasis upon life-cycle investment analysis. The central theme of our study is that investment in the railroads can best be explained by models which differ according to the historical stage of the industry's growth. A competing hypothesis would assert that the same model is applicable to every stage of the industry's life-cycle. Since Klein's models appear to be quite successful explanations of investment behavior during the inter-war period, they should be suitable for testing the "single model" hypothesis. If his models withstand this test, the result would be inconsistent with the hypothesis of differential behavior over an industry's life-cycle.
On the other hand, if a single investment model is inappropriate for all stages of the industry's lifetime, we must be prepared to develop alternative models for each of these industry stages. As suggested above, logical distinction can be made between the period of adolescent development, that of mature growth, and that of stagnation or decline. Thus we need three, presumably different, stage-ofgrowth models (to be referred to as "SG models") to describe the time pattern of aggregate railroad investment.
Let us first consider the process of investment determination in the adolescent stage. In this period, from 1872 to the mid-1890's, entry of firms into the industry is relatively frequent. New railroad investment is carried out in part by firms already in the industry (predominantly in the older Eastern and Midwestern regions), and in part by firms entering the industry for the first time (predominantly in the newer Southern and Western regions). The "old" firms operate with a given quantity of fixed capital constructed in past railroad booms and/or in expectation of future long-run demands. The level of existing fixed and rolling stock might be considered optimal for a given anticipated demand for output, which may include a certain degree of planned excess capacity.6 If the demand for transportation services on existing railroads increases, the rolling and fixed stock will be insufficient in relation to demand. Profits, both in absolute levels as well as in relation to existing stock, will increase providing there exists some excess capacity. If a firm is already at full capacity, further increase in demand will be met only with increases in per unit costs. Unless railroad rates are increased, profits will cease to grow and may even decline. The firm may offset these deleterious effects by charging higher rates for transportation services and/or by expanding fixed capital. The first course of action -increase in price -is less likely to be taken in theory and was avoided in fact. Prices of railroad services were not typically flexible in the short-run, and perhaps more important, excessive rates invited competition as well as public reaction.7 To pursue this simulation, "old" firms may not wait until all excess capacity is eliminated but may undertake new investment as the point of full capacity is approached. It appears then that the investment decision of firms already in the industry is likely to be based on the relationship of the existing stock of capital to that which would be optimal under prevailing output conditions.
The completeness of the capital stock adjustment model requires two further assumptions. First, it must be assumed that firms expect the changes in demand to be permanent, otherwise there would hardly be any rational basis for changing the size of capital stock in response to past changes in demand. This is not an unreasonable assumption for the 1870's and 1880's 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ment attributable to cost-reducing innovations.
There is some qualitative evidence which suggests that cost reducing innovations were not typically a motivating force per se but that such improvements as the steel rail, treated ties, Diesel engines and automatic couplers were utilized only when old equipment was being replaced or when new demand-induced investment was undertaken. 8 A final question remains concerning the role of the rate of interest in investment decisionmaking. In equilibrium, the marginal efficiency of capital of the last project will just equal the prevailing rate of interest. In the early stage of industry growth, however, disequilibrium is more likely in the sense that the long-run marginal efficiency of the last project exceeds the interest rate by a considerable margin. Under these conditions, fluctuations in the rate of interest (or some alternative measure of money capital costs), unless very marked, are likely to be largely irrelevant.
With respect to the lag structure, the reactions of management are likely to be relatively slow. Early railroad development took place in an era of inefficient communication systems, administrative procedures, and capital raising methods. Furthermore, given the relative growth of the industry in the 1870's and 1880's as compared to the 1920's, the composition of new investment was more of the long gestation type. A two-year lag would then appear to be appropriate in the earlier period since the facts bearing upon investment decisions were likely to have become known only in the next year, and the investment decision itself probably did not become effective until the year after. 9 In addition to investment carried out by firms already in the industry, in boom conditions new firms will tend to enter and establish a fixed capital base. The basic difference between the "old" and "new" firms is the element of risk which is considerably greater for new entrants in the less developed regions. These may have to be assured of fairly high profits before they may be able to raise the necessary finance. The firmest basis for estimates of future returns on capital is the profit experience of the existing firms. New firms will be induced to enter if the existing firms are exhibiting high profit rates, and especially if profits are showing an upward trend. Here again, because of the time needed for decision-making, capital raising and construction, a two-year lag is likely to be most appropriate. 10 If we combine the two types of investment behavior into a single model and assume linearity, we can express the postulated relationship as where x** equals net income (including nonoperating income). This model includes net income rather than net operating income since income from all sources is relevant when availability of finance -as distinct from a profitability measure -becomes crucial. The hypothesized change in lag from two years to one year can be explained both by the increased efficiency of communications, management and capital market transactions and by the secular decline in the importance of railroad investment of longer gestation.
IV Empirical Results
The tests of the hypotheses described in the previous section have been carried out by obtaining least squares estimates of the regression coefficients and their standard errors. The sources of the data are given in the appendix. The results are presented below. Klein's own estimates were based on data for the period 1922-1941 and both models were found to be satisfactory. The same conclusion cannot be drawn if the models are re-estimated on the basis of Ulmer's data. The most significant change is in the sign of the coefficient attached to the bond yields variable which now becomes positive -a result which is clearly unacceptable on theoretical grounds."5 An additional conflict arises with the coefficient of qt-i which becomes positive, although not significant.
The application of Klein's models to the early and middle periods also gives unsatisfactory results. The coefficient of the bond yield variable is not significantly different from zero and, furthermore, it appears to be persistently positive. 16 In addition, a test for the presence of autocorrelation indicated that in both periods disturbances in the regression equations were most probably autocorrelated. If Ulmer's data are reasonably reliable, then it is obvious that Klein's models do not stand up to more extensive examination. They are unsuccessful not only in explaining investment behavior in the earlier periods, but also in producing sensible results for the period for which they were designed.
Let us now consider the empirical results regarding the stage-of-growth models developed in the preceding section of this paper. yield variable without lag but indicated that a lag of one year could have been used with equal justification and that, in fact, the estimate was not materially affected.
Stage-of-Growth Models
15The bond yield measure used in the re-estimated regression equation differs slightly from that used by Klein. The equations were also re-estimated using the Klein series of bond yields in conjunction with Ulmer's data for the remaining variables but the results did not differ substantially from those given in the text above. '6 For all three periods, this result appeared consistently. External cost constraints, either measured by bond yields or stock yields, never seem to have had a systematic depressing influence upon aggregate railroad investment, regardless of the industry's stage-of-growth. investment by new firms, clearly appear to be important explanatory variables. The relative importance of the two sources of variation in investment -the stock-adjustment and the expected profitability measures -should be of some interest. We have evaluated this by taking into account the magnitudes of the coefficients as well as the variation in the respective explanatory variables. Apart from the changes in investment due to joint variation, we found that changes in profitability measures were somewhat more important in affecting variation in railroad investment than changes in the stock-adjustment variables. '9 As a matter of interest, we have also fitted a relationship similar to (SG 1) but one in which the stock adjustment variables were replaced by a single variable (Xt1 -Xt-2), a simple accelerator principle. Whether we tested the simple accelerator by itself or combined with profitability indicators, the results were poor. The goodness of fit was much lower than that of (SG 1) and, more important, the acceleration coefficient was smaller than its standard error.
The regression equation relating to the stage of mature growth reveals that a very high proportion of the variation in aggregate railroad investment can be explained by stock-adjustment factors alone. Autonomous investment is again found to be probably negligible. The estimate of the "normal" capital-output ratio for this period is 4.08 while the "reaction" coefficient is considerably lower than that of the earlier period. 20 The numerical values of the coefficients were little affected by changing the 17 For the development of the correction formula see, for example, Goldberger [11, pp. 236-243]. 18 If there were some planned excess capacity and Chenery's modification of the stock-adjustment model applied, the "normal" capital-output ratio would be somewhat lower and the "reaction" coefficient somewhat higher than the quoted figures. In any case the result appears to be consistent with the findings of other research workers, e.g., Kuh [18] 
